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Abstract Traditional life insurance products, in particular participating life insur-
ance contracts, are often criticized. Their performance is often said to be poor com-
pared to other investment alternatives. Interestingly, this perception appears to persist
although very little research has been conducted into the performance of participating
life insurance contracts. But are participating life insurance contracts actually bad for
policyholders? We conduct a performance analysis based on contracts offered in the
German market, in order to provide evidence to support decision making by policy-
holders.
Zusammenfassung Traditionelle Lebensversicherungsprodukte wie die gemischte
Kapitallebensversicherungen werden seit Jahren immer wieder kritisiert. Zu nen-
nen ist zum Beispiel der Hamburger Ampelcheck, welcher die gemischte Ka-
pitallebensversicherung als nicht geeignet für die Altersvorsorge ansieht. Doch
wie gut oder schlecht ist dieses Versicherungsprodukt wirklich für die Versiche-
rungsnehmer? Die Forschung in diesem Bereich ist limitiert. Deshalb führen wir
eine umfassende Performanceanalyse von der gemischten Kapitallebensversiche-
rung durch, um privaten Investoren eine Entscheidungshilfe zur Verfügung zu
stellen.
This article summarizes main findings of the paper “A Performance Analysis of Participating Life
Insurance Contracts” by Faust et al. (2010) as it was presented at the annual meeting of the German
Association for Insurance Science in Berlin in March 2011. Details regarding methodology and
detailed results can be found in the original paper.
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1 Introduction
As a consequence of the financial crisis, private investors currently seek for safe in-
vestments with low downside risk. In this context, minimum interest rate guarantees
embedded in financial products are one option for investors. Insurance companies
offer investment products with such a downside protection and are often perceived
as safe harbor.1 The participating life insurance (PLI hereafter) is one of the most
important products in the life insurance sector with a built in minimum interest rate
guarantee. In most European countries, these contracts are typically characterized by
an embedded term life insurance, a cliquet-style interest rate guarantee,2 and bonus
participation rules with regard to the insurer’s reserve situation (surplus fund). How-
ever, administrative costs and complex profit distribution schemes between policy-
holders and shareholders make it difficult to measure the performance of this product
from the policyholder’s point of view.
The characteristics of PLI contracts make it difficult to measure their performance.
A PLI embeds various (explicit and implicit) options as well as complex bonus dis-
tribution schemes between policyholders and shareholders. In addition, an insurance
company’s management has a certain discretion with respect to some parameters. Fur-
thermore, wealth transfers between different groups of policyholders take place. In
order to get over these difficulties, we measure the performance of PLI contracts from
an ex ante perspective while taking embedded options, bonus distribution, and man-
agement’s discretion into account. We empirically calibrate our model with market
data and simulate various insurance collectives to incorporate wealth transfer effects.
In order to get a clear picture of the performance of PLI, we decompose PLI in a
term life insurance and an investment part and simulate the cash flow distribution of
the investment part under the real world measure P. Further, we create two bench-
mark portfolios based on the same underlying to measure the impact of the interest
rate guarantee and the bonus distribution rules on the cash flows of the portfolio. By
calibrating our model with empirical market data, we are able to show in which cases
the interest rate guarantee and the mechanisms applied by the insurance company
can be beneficial to the policyholder. In addition, we show how the payoff distribu-
tion depends on the initial reserve situation and management’s discretion. We do not
benchmark the PLI using a fair (risk-neutral) pricing approach, which would mean
to compare the observed market price with the calculated fair price, because we be-
lieve that the underlying assumption of perfect and frictionless markets is rather not
fulfilled in this context. We doubt that instruments exist that enable policyholders to
replicate the PLI’s cash flows. We think that consumers will rather judge products
depending on personal preferences and actually available alternatives.
1For example, in the German life insurance market, the estimated increase in premium income
in 2009 is 4.8 percent compared to 0.8% in 2008 (see GDV, 2009, Beitragseinnahmen der Ver-
sicherungswirtschaft, accessed January, 2010 at http://www.gdv.de/Downloads/Pressemeldungen_2009/
Tabellenanhang_PM_2009.pdf). This increase might be mainly attributable to an increased risk aversion
and/or risk awareness following the financial crisis.
2In case of a cliquet-style interest rate guarantee, the guaranteed rate of interest has to be credited to the
policyholders’ account on a year-to-year basis.
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The contribution is that we neither rely on a single performance measurement
ratio nor do we provide an ex post analysis. Instead, the introduced framework al-
lows a comparison of the complete payoff distribution on an ex ante basis. This
general approach is subsequently not bonded to one specific subjective preference
scheme. Further, we model an insurance company with various insurance collec-
tives in order to incorporate wealth transfer effects between different groups of
policyholders. Only Hansen and Miltersen (2002) analyzed participating life in-
surance contracts with pooled accounts before, but just for a two-policyholders
case.
2 Model framework
Here, we briefly explain the model framework. For a detailed description including all
relevant formulas, refer to the original paper by Faust et al. (2010). First, we illustrate
an insurance company which has only one single insurance contract. In Sect. 2.5, the
mechanism introduced for the single contract company is applied to an insurer with
more than one contract.
2.1 Basic model framework
Our model builds on PLI contracts offered in Germany, but could be easily applied to
similar regulatory frameworks (e.g., Switzerland or Austria). The policyholder pays a
constant annual premium at the beginning of each year given no previous termination
of the contract by death or surrender. The insurance company uses a certain amount
of the annual premium to cover its costs. Costs are divided into annual operational
costs and acquisition costs. The latter are allocated over the first five years of the
contract. Another part of the premium is needed to cover the term life insurance.
The remaining amount of the annual premium is invested in an asset portfolio. This
savings part of the premium features an annual minimum interest rate and builds up
the policyholder’s savings account.
To calculate the annual premium for the term life insurance contract, we use ac-
tuarial fair premiums and market loadings. To account for a decreasing sum insured
(also referred to as net amount at risk), the term life insurance premium is annually
adjusted so that the sum insured equals the guaranteed death benefit minus the accu-
mulated savings account. Thereby, the guaranteed death benefit equals the guaranteed
terminal payment as common in most PLI contracts.
The investment in the investment alternatives equals the annual premium minus
the premium for the term life insurance contract. In addition, front-end loads as a
proportion of assets invested are subtracted. In order to incorporate management and
administrative fees associated with these benchmark portfolios, an annual fee (de-
fined as a percentage of the total assets) is deducted at the end of each year. Thus,
it becomes clear that the benchmark portfolios have another cost structure than the
PLI. While costs regarding the PLI contract are charged in absolute values in terms
of annual operational costs and acquisition costs, the benchmark portfolios involve
front-end loads and annual fees in percent.
710 R. Faust et al.
Table 1 Balance sheet of a simulated insurance company
Assets (market values) Liabilities (market values)
Ar : assets attributable to
policyholders (either on an
individual or collective basis)
Af : surplus fund
Ag : policyholders’ savings accounts (subject to minimum interest
rate guarantee)
Adp : policyholders’ distributed profits accounts
Adtb: policyholders’ distributed terminal bonus accounts
Because we are interested in the investment result of the PLI and not in the effect
of the term life insurance, we analyze only the savings parts of both premiums. We as-
sume that the investor wants to buy a term life insurance contract in both alternatives
and hence, this part of the contract does not influence his decision.
2.2 Portfolio development
We illustrate a simplified balance sheet of an insurance company with market value
accounting in Table 1. The liability side of this balance sheet can be divided into
two different parts, the policyholders’ accounts, Ag , Adp , and Adtb , as well as the
surplus fund Af . While the policyholders’ accounts are attributable to policyholders
on an individual basis, the surplus fund is attributable to all policyholders as a group.
Although the single contract company has only one policyholder, the surplus fund is
still different from the policyholders’ accounts: The surplus fund has the function of
a risk buffer. That is to say it is built up in times of high returns on the asset portfolio
and reduced in times of low returns. Grosen and Jørgensen (2000) work with a similar
account, the so-called bonus reserve, which is determined by the difference between
book and market values.
We assume that the insurance company invests in a diversified portfolio of stocks
and bonds. In our model, the return on this asset portfolio is first used to cover this
interest rate guarantee. If the achieved return is insufficient to cover the guarantee, ad-
ditional capital will be required to cover the interest rate guarantee. We assume that
the insurance company is always able to cover this required amount of capital by eq-
uity capital. If the PLI’s earnings on assets are positive after covering the interest rate
guarantee, the remaining profit is distributed to the surplus fund Af , to shareholders
in form of dividends, and to the insurer’s equity capital (retentions of earnings).
On the contrary, the benchmark portfolios do not involve any interest rate guaran-
tee or bonus distribution scheme.
2.3 Bonus distribution
In participating policies, the insurance company is obligated to give policyholders
a share in profits. The surplus fund Af provides an intermediate mechanism which
aims at stabilizing returns to policyholders over time. We introduce a decision rule
based on the framework presented in Kling et al. (2007) in order to establish a bonus
distribution mechanism in our model.
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The insurance company defines a certain target rate of interest which is planned
to be granted to the policyholders’ accounts annually in order to maintain returns for
policyholders stable. This target rate of interest is given to the policyholders as long
as the surplus fund quota Af /Ag stays within a defined range. In order to maintain
returns to policyholders stable on a year-to-year basis whenever possible, the target
rate of interest generally applies to all accounts which are attributable to policyholders
on an individual basis even though the interest rate guarantee only applies to the
savings account.
These profits are allocated between the policyholder’s terminal bonus account
Adtb and the policyholder’s distributed profits account Adp .
2.4 Cash flows
We distinguish between three possible events which lead to a payoff to the policy-
holder (or his heirs respectively). Namely, surrender of the policy before maturity,
death before maturity, or survival until maturity.
In case of death, policyholders (or rather their heirs) receive the total amount on
their accounts, i.e., their savings accounts, their distributed profits accounts, and their
distributed terminal bonus accounts. In addition, policyholders’ heirs would receive
the sum insured of the term life insurance contract. However, since we are interested
in the investment result of the PLI and not in the effect of the term life insurance, we
do not include this cash flow in our subsequent analysis.
If a policyholder cancels his policy, he receives the amount on his savings account,
on his distributed bonus account, and the fraction of his distributed terminal bonus
account whereas a penalty is applied to the savings and the distributed bonus account.
Finally, if a policyholder continues the contract until maturity, the insurer pays the
total amount of his different accounts. As we employ a discrete time model, death
and cancellation in the last period are assumed to lead to equal payoffs at maturity.
Unlike the PLI contract, the benchmarks do not differentiate between death of the
policyholder, surrender, and survival until maturity. Hence, the current value of the
respective benchmark portfolio is paid out in all three possible events. Consequently,
there is not any explicit surrender charge. However, there is an implicit surrender
charge since front-end loads are distributed over less periods and, therefore, loads are
higher in percent per year.
2.5 Modeling the insurer’s portfolio
After introducing our model for a single contract insurance company, we apply it
to an insurance company with more than one contract. We simulate a life insurance
company’s underwriting portfolio with various insurance collectives. The contract
duration is the same for all collectives but the different collectives vary in their re-
maining time to maturity. Each insurance collective is homogeneous, i.e., contains
policyholders of same age and mortality whose contracts have the same remaining
time to maturity. The insurance company starts with one single insurance collective
at point in time 0. Then, every year a new collective is initiated.
The basic mechanisms introduced remain the same. However, there is only one
surplus fund account Af for all contracts whereas the policyholders’ accounts (Ag ,
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Adp , and Adtb) remain on an individual basis. One additional difference between the
previously introduced single contract company and the various insurance collectives
is that with more than one contract cash outflows occur every year based on how many
members of each collective die or cancel their policy.3 If a policyholder surrenders,
the amount on his savings, distributed profits, and terminal bonus account which is
not paid out is distributed to the joint surplus fund Af . Hence, policyholders profit
from the cancellation of others.
We assume that mortality and surrender risk can be diversified away by the law
of large numbers. That is to say, each insurance collective consists of so many indi-
vidual policyholders, who die and surrender independently of each other, that a de-
terministic fraction of each collective dies and surrenders in each period based on the
individual mortality tables and probabilities of cancellations (see also, e.g., Hansen
and Miltersen 2002).
Our numerical analysis focuses on single contracts given the surplus fund in order
to analyze payoffs obtained by individual policyholders.
3 Numerical analysis
3.1 Model calibration
We apply our model to contracts with a maturity of twelve years. We assume that
policyholders start premium payments at the beginning of age 53 so that they would
receive their survival benefit at the beginning of age 65 (retirement). We base our
contract parameters on the actual offering of a German life insurance company.4 The
policyholder pays an annual premium of 5000€ and has a guaranteed death benefit of
61491€. Acquisition costs of 1487.70€ are allocated over the first five years. Annual
administrative costs are 202.97€.
We consider two benchmark portfolios: A mutual fund (MF) and an exchange-
traded fund (ETF). Both are very common investment alternatives for private in-
vestors but involve different transaction costs. Thereby, the ETF benchmark is a kind
of extreme case due to its low fees. We calculate fees for these benchmark portfolios
based on fees reported by Khorana et al. (2007) for MFs sold in Germany and based
on calculations provided by the Frankfurt Stock Exchange for ETFs.5
3.2 Surplus fund
Besides the function of stabilizing profits over time, the surplus fund is also an ad-
ditional source of income for policyholders. If a policyholder enters an insurance
company possessing a high amount of assets in the surplus fund, this policyholder
3In the single contract company, only one cash flow will occur after which the insurance company ceases
to exist (as the single contract was paid out).
4We used a contract offered by the HUK Coburg (cf. www.huk.de). The information used for our simula-
tion in respect to the contract calibration are publicly available.
5See http://www.boerse-frankfurt.de/DE/MediaLibrary/Document/Sonstiges/etf_handbuch.pdf.
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Fig. 1 Development of the expected surplus fund in the sample case. The dashed lines provide the lower
and upper bounds in each year, which are constant once the 12th insurance collective has been set up
will profit from earnings of a surplus fund which was built up by others. On the other
hand, if the policyholder enters a contract when the surplus fund is comparably low,
he will tend to build it up whereof future policyholders will profit. Hence, there is a
kind of cross-subsidization between policyholders. Thus, from a policyholder’s per-
spective, the level of the surplus fund is crucial. However, individuals who enter a
PLI contract do in general not know the level and whether the surplus fund is rather
stable or not.6
Figure 1 shows how the surplus fund develops on average over time in our sample
case. The dashed lines provide the lower and upper bounds in each year, which are
constant in our setting once the 12th insurance collective has been set up. Based
on the convergence behavior observable, we analyze contracts with three differ-
ent starting points. Contract 1 starts at point in time 0 when the surplus fund is
empty (Af,initiation = 0). Contract 2 is established at the end of the 12th year when
12 collectives exist and the surplus fund has partially been built up. At point in
time 24, when the surplus fund is rather stable, contract 3 is initiated. Each contract
(contract 1, contract 2, contract 3) refers to one single policyholder in the collec-
tive.
Costumers benefit if they enter when the surplus fund has already been built up
(contract 3). Then they will (on average) earn returns on assets others paid for and do
not have to pay for assets which others will benefit of. Certainly, it is less beneficial if
6In order to gather an indication of the current level of the surplus fund, policyholders could analyze
the balance sheet of the insurance company. However, the balance sheet might only provide information
on book values but not on the required market values. Hence, a policyholder would need a high level of
financial literacy in order to be able to derive implications on the actual level of the surplus fund.
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policyholders still have to build up the surplus fund (contract 1, contract 2). However,
entering the contract when the surplus fund is greater than zero (contract 2), the pol-
icyholders might still profit from this mechanism due to earnings provided by assets
already in the surplus fund.
In order to clarify results with respect to the last period which accounts for more
than 70% of all outcomes, we illustrate the payoff distributions (histograms) of the
PLI contracts and the benchmark portfolios for period 12 in Fig. 2. The figure shows
how peaked the PLIs’ payoff distributions are compared to the MF and the ETF. The
payoff distribution of the ETF is very similar to the one of the MF but is shifted
to the right due to the lower transaction costs. Comparing contract 1 and 3 shows
that the payoff distribution of contract 1 is shifted to the left with a lower upside
potential.
3.3 Management’s discretion
Our previous results have shown that the surplus fund has an important impact on the
payoff distribution. However, we assumed parameters to be constant and differences
with respect to the different contracts were caused by the initial level of the surplus
fund. In what follows, we analyze the effects of management’s discretion with regard
to contract 3. We examine the effect on the PLI’s payoff distribution if management
changes the target rate of interest directly after the policyholder’s first premium pay-
ment. We focus on an increase of the target rate from rz = 3.5% to rz = 4.0% and a
decrease to rz = 3.0%.
Similar to Figs. 1, 3a and 3b show how the surplus fund develops on average
over time given the change of the target rate of interest in year 24. The dashed lines
provide the lower and upper bounds in each year, the dotted line displays the level of
the surplus fund given no change in the target interest rate. If the target rate increases
to rz = 4.0%, the surplus fund first decreases and then stabilizes at a lower level.
On the contrary, with a decrease to rz = 3.0%, the surplus fund first increases and
then stabilizes at a higher level. Figure 3c and 3d show the payoff distribution in the
last period (similar to Fig. 2). The dotted line denotes the density function given no
target rate change. Both rate changes, rz = 3.0% and rz = 4.0%, lead to a much less
peaked payoff distribution compared to the contract without a change of the target
rate. In addition, the rate change to rz = 3.0% causes the payoff distribution to be
more skewed than the change to rz = 4.0%.
3.4 Performance measurement
Next, a preference dependent valuation of the different investment opportunities is de-
rived based on the payoff distributions shown. In order to do so, assumptions regard-
ing the state and time preferences of the policyholder are needed. In this subsection,
we assume that whenever payments take place before the end of maturity (because of
surrender or death of the investor), the corresponding cash-flows are reinvested and
compounded with the annual minimum interest rate. This yields one single cash flow
distribution LT at time T for each investment alternative.
The premiums paid into the different saving products (i.e., after detaching the term
life insurance) are the same for all alternatives. Compounding the premium payments
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Fig. 2 Histograms and mean of the payoff distributions conditional upon payout in the last year for each
contract
with the interest rate, while taking surrender and survival probabilities of the policy-
holder into account, leads to a (deterministic) terminal value of premium payments
of YT = 55518. As it is done in Gatzert and Schmeiser (2009), we perform a com-
parison of the four different cases by using modified forms of three different classical
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Fig. 3 Histograms and mean of the payoff distributions of contract 3 conditional upon payout in the last
year given a change in the target rate of interest at the beginning of the contract’s life. Panel (a) and (b)
show the corresponding expected level of the surplus fund
performance measures. First, an adaption of the Sharpe ratio (see Sharpe 1966) can
be defined in the following way:
Sharpe ratio(LT ) = E(LT ) − YT
σ(LT )
(1)
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Table 2 Modified performance
measures for the valuation of
four different investment
opportunities
Contract type Sharpe ratio Omega Sortino ratio
PLI Contract 1 −0.057 −0.133 −0.063
PLI Contract 3 0.109 0.286 0.133
MF 0.020 0.049 0.023
ETF 0.238 0.689 0.313
For instance, in the case of the ETF benchmark portfolio, this will lead to
Sharpe ratio(LT ) ≈ 60536 − 5551821083 ≈ 0.238 (2)
Following Gatzert and Schmeiser (2009), a modified form of Omega and the
Sortino ratio can be defined by (see Shadwick and Keating 2002; Sortino and
van Der Meer 1991)
Omega(LT ) = E(LT ) − YT
E(max(YT − LT ,0)) (3)
and
Sortino ratio(LT ) = E(LT ) − YT√
E(max(YT − LT ,0)2)
. (4)
Table 2 provides an overview of the different performance ratios of the four in-
vestment opportunities in focus. The used performance measurements give a clear
picture: The contract type ETF dominates all other investment forms analyzed. Per-
formance ratios are best for the ETF portfolio and worst for PLI contract 1 as already
indicated by our previous results. Further, PLI contract 3 dominates the MF bench-
mark and PLI contract 1, whereas contract 1 is dominated by all other alternatives.
Hence, PLI contract 3 appears to be superior to the MF portfolio given our underlying
assumptions about preferences.
To conclude, the ETF benchmark portfolio appears to be the best choice due to the
low transaction costs. On the other hand, if the surplus fund is already built up, the
PLI tends to perform better than the MF benchmark.
4 Conclusion
This article provides a summary of the paper of Faust et al. (2010) that was presented
at the annual meeting of the German Association for Insurance Science in Berlin in
March 2011.
We analyze the controversial question whether participating life insurance con-
tracts are actually beneficial for policyholders. Even though this contract form is very
common in insurance practice, only very little research has been conducted in respect
to its performance. In a first step, a framework to estimate payoffs from participating
life insurance contracts from the point of view of policyholders is developed. In order
to do so, we decompose a participating life insurance contract into an investment part
and a term life insurance. Hence, we are able to analyze the benefits of the minimum
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interest rate guarantee in combination with the profit distribution rules independent
from the term life insurance. Thereby, we model more than one single contract which
allows us to incorporate distribution effects between policyholders. In a second step,
we simulate and benchmark the complete payoff distribution on an ex ante basis. We
show how the payoff distribution depends on the level of the surplus fund at inception
of the contract and analyze the effect of management’s discretion.
To conclude, the paper shows that policyholders have very little chance to prede-
termine the cash flow distribution as long as the future behavior of management and
the current level of the surplus fund are unknown or realistic assumption cannot be
derived in this respect. Also, our preference dependent performance analysis shows
that in most cases an ETF portfolio will assumedly perform better than each possible
participating life insurance contract.
In order to get a better understanding of how the underlying capital market pa-
rameters influence the performance, future research could analyze a more detailed
asset model (i.e., an interest rate model for the bond fraction of the asset portfolio) or
derive sensitivities with regard to drift and volatility of stocks and bonds. In addition,
longer contract periods may be analyzed.
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